Translation, editing : Gan Yung Chyan, KUCINTA SETIA
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News (1)
Insider shocking news: Beidaihe secretly finalizes Xi's stay and the selection of Central Committee members
— The Beidaihe meeting may finalize the list of the 21st Standing Committee members and the Central Committee members
Report by : Li Yu / Editor: Fang Xun / Source: People's Daily / https://www.aboluowang.com/2025/0806/2258153.html
The CCP's most secretive meeting has begun in Beidaihe.
While party media touts Beijing's top leadership as entering a leisurely, vacation-style work mode, outsiders remain suspicious that beneath the veil of strolling on the beach and enjoying a cup of tea, the CCP's top secrets are hidden.
Du Wen, former Executive Director of the Legal Advisory Office of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region Government, has received reliable information that the core topic of this year's Beidaihe meeting will be finalizing the list of some Standing Committee members and Central Committee members for the 21st National Congress.
The CCP's political function as Beidaihe's "Summer Capital" stems from its first-generation leader, Mao Zedong, who preferred to work in Beidaihe during the summer. The CPC Central Committee established a summer work committee and supporting service mechanisms to support this effort.
According to reliable information Du Wen has received, approximately one-third of the staff of the General Office of the CPC Central Committee has relocated to Beidaihe.
Beginning on 2 August 2025, Xi Jinping, all members of the Politburo Standing Committee, and some members of the Politburo have officially moved into the Beidaihe sanatorium affiliated with the General Office of the CPC Central Committee.
This "informal decision-making forum" has been used by the CCP leadership to discuss major strategic issues, leadership team personnel arrangements, coordinate internal voices, and unify ideas. Although the political function of the Beidaihe Conference has weakened since the Hu Jintao era, this year's meeting is particularly special.
Du Wen stated that the period from now until mid-August is a critical window for determining the future fate of China's political landscape.
On the eve of the Beidaihe meeting, rumors circulated that the meeting would discuss the transfer of power to Xi Jinping and the selection of his successor.
Du Wen revealed that he had received reliable information that the real core topic of this year's Beidaihe meeting was to secretly finalize the candidates for the Central Committee and some Politburo members for the 21st National Congress of the Communist Party of China in 2027.
This means determining whether Xi Jinping will step down or remain at the 21st National Congress, as well as the roadmap for China's future political direction and governing style.
The 21st National Congress of the Communist Party of China will be held in Beijing in the fall of 2027. Delegates to the 21st National Congress will be elected by 40 electoral units nationwide.
The meeting will elect the new leadership of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, including members and alternate members of the Central Committee, and members of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection.
At the subsequent Central Committee meeting, elections will be held for the General Secretary of the Central Committee, the Political Bureau, the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, the Central Secretariat, and the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China.
Du Wen analyzed that starting next year, Party committees at the township, county, city, and provincial levels will be replaced in succession, and these personnel arrangements must be finalized in advance.
The vast majority of key candidates (Central Committee members) for the 21st National Congress must be in place or internally selected before January 1, 2027, so that they can be elected as delegates to the 21st National Congress and subsequently enter, retain their positions, or resign from the Central Committee.
Why must these lists be finalized so far in advance? Du Wen explained that this is necessary to allow time for the Organization Department and the Discipline Inspection Commission to conduct political reviews and conduct political screening for transfers. It also provides time and space for local organizational departments to arrange the election of relevant personnel.
Du Wen believes that Xi Jinping will not cede power, nor will he step down or semi-retire at the 21st National Congress.
Most importantly, Xi Jinping has persecuted too many people, and his hands are stained with the blood of the CCP's powerful.
Seceding means he has no way out.
If there are any uncertainties, they could be Xi Jinping's own health or unforeseen unexpected events.
At the same time, Du Wen also emphasized that rare signs of tension are emerging within the CCP due to economic and political difficulties.
Weibo personality Zhai Shanying recently analyzed on his channel that China's current economic situation is fundamentally similar to that before the collapse of the Soviet Union.
He described Chinese society in 2025 as entering a state of "sparks of chaos" out of control.
Social incidents stemming from financial fraud, wage arrears, school violence, food safety crises, legal injustices, and medical insurance closures have increased dramatically compared to 2024.
He believes that wherever this spark lands, it will cause unrest in that region, potentially setting the stage for nationwide unrest.
And these disturbances are bound to increase and accelerate.
Recently, a video of a 14-year-old girl being bullied in Jiangyou City, Sichuan Province, has attracted attention.
On August 4th, local police's lenient handling of the perpetrators sparked thousands of protesters demanding justice for the girl.
Wang Dan, a prominent democracy activist, stated on his YouTube channel that people's resistance is the biggest variable in Chinese society.
The Jiangyou incident shows that people's tolerance for institutional indifference is reaching a breaking point.
He believes that from the Li Wenliang incident and the "Women in Chains" incident to today, protesters have never disappeared; they are simply biding their time.
Commentary
Is Zhang Youxia and Xi's "mutual destruction" a different kind of situation?
—Du Zheng: Beidaihe Conference power struggle secrets have been leaked
Commentator : Du Zheng / Editor : Fang Xun / Source : Shangbao / https://www.aboluowang.com/2025/0807/2258789.html / Image : Web Screenshot
The summer of 2025 will be another difficult season of disaster for the Chinese people; for the CCP's elite, it will be a time rife with corruption, scandal, and shady political maneuvers.
Poisonous mosquitoes invade Beijing
Chikungunya fever (also known as chikungunya), transmitted by the Aedes mosquito, was first discovered in Tanzania in 1952. Twenty years earlier, it had been a major outbreak on the Indian Ocean island of Réunion, with reports from over 100 countries but its resurgence, two decades later, began in China.
In early July, an outbreak of chikungunya in Foshan, Guangdong, rapidly spread throughout the province, reaching Macau, Hong Kong, Beijing, Hunan, and other places, potentially reaching the entire country. However, neither Beijing nor Hunan has released data, demonstrating a profound lack of transparency in official operations. However, with poisonous mosquitoes invading Beijing, the powerful in Zhongnanhai have few options for avoiding infection.
Across China, the extreme epidemic prevention measures used during the COVID-19 outbreak a few years ago are being replicated, with nucleic acid testing restarted and designated hospitals and mosquito-proof isolation beds deployed on a large scale. To investigate stagnant water and eliminate mosquitoes, some communities are breaking into rental homes and cutting off electricity to residents who refuse home inspections. Some areas have begun registering the personal information of those purchasing antipyretic medications.
Fuzhou is requiring people arriving from high-risk areas to undergo 14 days of self-health monitoring. Some districts in Zhuhai are screening those with a history of travel to Foshan, and hotels are refusing to accept Foshan residents.
On 1 August 2025, Chinese Vice Premier Liu Guozhong emphasized in Foshan, Guangdong, that "we must go all out to win the battle against the epidemic."
The Chinese Communist Party has a history of using various campaigns to strengthen public obedience to power. The authorities' nationwide epidemic prevention campaign against the Chikungunya virus, which has a very low mortality rate and is not transmissible between humans, has a specific political element of maintaining stability and is also intended to ensure social control over a series of major political events, including the Beidaihe meeting, the Fourth Plenary Session of the 19th Central Committee, and the September 3rd military parade in Beijing.
However, this approach will inevitably have a devastating impact on the Chinese economy.
The muddy handprints of an elderly man struggling in the aftermath of a flood
Mosquitoes love water, but mosquito eradication campaigns are being plagued by floods.
Recent floods have devastated North China. Due to heavy rains and reservoir releases, official data indicates 44 deaths in Beijing, but public opinion suggests a cover-up. Thirty-one of these deaths occurred at a nursing home in Taishitun Town, Miyun District, Beijing, where muddy handprints of elderly residents struggling to survive were left at the scene. The Caixin article revealing this detail has been removed from the internet, citing the authorities' desire to promote a "socially bright" theory.
Regarding the floods, the current seven members of the Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) have paid little attention, merely sitting in Zhongnanhai issuing directives. This is a stark departure from past CCP leaders like Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabao, and Li Keqiang, who personally inspected flood conditions. Now, Xi Jinping and Li Qiang are even unwilling to make a show of it.
Zhang Guoqing, a member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and Vice Premier, visited Xinglong County, Chengde City, Hebei Province, following the disaster. Many people were swept away by the floods, the devastation was devastating, and official rescue efforts were slow.
Officials claim that "people and life are supreme" actually mean "people and life are secondary." Party media even published an article claiming that "Xi Jinping always has the people at heart when deploying flood prevention and disaster relief efforts." This deliberate whitewashing cannot conceal the truth.
The Flower Monk's joke
Amidst a wave of natural and man-made disasters, China has been embezzled by the scandal of the lecherous monk Shi Yongxin. On the evening of July 27th, the Shaolin Temple Management Office, a new government agency that has taken over the Shaolin Temple, announced the dismissal of Shaolin Abbot Shi Yongxin. Shi Yongxin's charges include misappropriation of project funds and temple assets; serious violations of Buddhist precepts, and long-term illicit relationships with multiple women, resulting in the fathering of illegitimate children.
These were charges Shi Yongxin had been reported against ten years ago, but denied by the official investigation report at the time. Over the past decade, Shi Yongxin has used the commercialization of Shaolin Temple as a pretext to continue his misdeeds, enjoying imperial treatment within the temple and engaging in religious diplomacy on behalf of the CCP when traveling abroad. Over the past decade, Shaolin Temple has become a pawn in the CCP's "Belt and Road" expansion efforts.
Chinese temples are part of the officialdom. Monks, originally practitioners, are forced to follow the atheist Party, and even abbots have cadre ranks. Shi Yongxin, formerly Vice President of the Buddhist Association of China, President of the Henan Buddhist Association, and a deputy to the National People's Congress, is a member of the CCP elite. The Buddhist Association subsequently expressed its firm support for Shi Yongxin's handling, fully in line with the CCP's anti-corruption stance.
Asking why Shi Yongxin remained undefeated despite being accused for so many years, many have cited various backers, including Zhao Puchu, the first president of the Buddhist Association of China; former CCP General Secretary Jiang Zemin; Li Changchun, a member of the Standing Committee of the Jiang faction who once governed Henan; and Wang Zuoan, former Director of the State Administration for Religious Affairs. However, Xi Jinping, who has been in power for nearly thirteen years, is Shi Yongxin's greatest backer.
Shi Yongxin is both a "political monk" and an "economic monk," and even more so, a promiscuous "flower monk." Regardless of which high-ranking official he worked for, he was at least a member of the Party. The fact that two reports on this "flower monk" over the past decade have contradicted each other directly contradicts Xi Jinping, who claims to be deeply hostile to corruption.
Just as Xi's military confidants like Miao Hua were arrested one by one, gradually eroding his authority (not power) within the military, the sudden downfall of Shi Yongxin, after being protected by Xi for a decade, further erodes the authority Xi had built in society through his anti-corruption campaign.
The Fourth Plenum of the Communist Party of China in October is crucial, and we must be mindful of the possibility of unexpected "up and down transitions" and "promotions and demotions." (File photo/AP)
The power struggle in Beidaihe: Behind the scenes
Poisonous mosquitoes, floods, and even "flower monks" are all child's play in Zhongnanhai. Maintaining regime stability, especially the control of supreme power, is the top priority.
On 1 August 2025, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Guo Jiakun announced that, due to the 2025 summer vacation, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' regular press conferences will be suspended from 4 August (Monday) to 15 August 2025 (Friday), resuming on 18 August 2025 (Monday).
Beijing's official media reported on 3 July 2025 that Cai Qi, a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and Secretary of the CPC Central Secretariat, visited experts on summer vacation in Beidaihe that day.
This marks the arrival of the Beidaihe holiday-style meeting, attended by veteran and current CCP leaders, whose content has never been officially disclosed.
In fact, since late June, reports have been circulating of heightened security along the route from Beijing to the coastal city of Beidaihe in Hebei Province, with a surge in checkpoints and multiple checks at stations and trains. Petitioners and dissidents in Beijing or traveling to Beidaihe have been strictly controlled. Reports have surfaced from various locations of petitioners going missing or being detained in black jails.
Numerous secrets of power struggles have been revealed at the Beidaihe conferences over the years.
For example, at the 2013 Beidaihe conference, rumors surfaced of two assassination attempts by former political and legal tycoon Zhou Yongkang. Before the 2017 Beidaihe conference, news broke that Xi Jinping had installed bulletproof glass in Villa No. 0, where he was staying in Beidaihe.
Although there were no further assassination attempts at the Beidaihe meeting following the 20th National Congress in 2022, Japanese media outlets reported in 2023 that veteran military leader Chi Haotian participated in Zeng Qinghong's attempt to force abdication, exerting silent pressure on Xi Jinping to restructure the military.
During the 2024 Beidaihe meeting, rumors circulated that Xi Jinping was facing a health and power crisis. After the Beidaihe meeting, Xi resumed public appearances, meeting with To Lam, the new General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam. CCTV's midday broadcast of the welcoming ceremony featured a rare, all-inclusive long-range shot. Subsequent footage of Xi Jinping's meeting with To Lam and his attendance at the signing ceremony with To Lam was also absent, sparking widespread speculation.
This year's Beidaihe meeting is expected to include internal discussions on the final disposition of Miao Hua, Director of the Political Work Department of the Central Military Commission. The subsequent handling of He Weidong, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, who has been absent since the National People's Congress in March, is also expected to spark debate among various factions. However, all of this is being orchestrated behind the scenes.
The Fourth Plenary Session may hold hidden topics
The Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China (CPC) decided at a meeting on July 30th to convene the Fourth Plenary Session of the 20th CPC Central Committee in Beijing in October to study the "Proposal on Formulating the 15th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development (abbreviated as the 15th Five-Year Plan)."
Because the CPC's 15th Five-Year Plan spans 2027, and if the CPC still holds its 21st National Congress, which will be held in 2027, can Xi Jinping continue to serve as the top leader? What supporting plans will be proposed? These issues need to be resolved in advance. The showdown between the various factions within the CPC will likely take place at the Beidaihe meeting, and once consensus is reached, the Fourth Plenary Session will be a formality.
A review of the topics of the nine Fourth Plenary Sessions of the CPC Central Committee since the reform and opening up of the CPC shows that, with the exception of the 11th Fourth Plenary Session in 1979, which focused on agricultural development, the remaining eight addressed political issues.
The 12th Fourth Plenary Session in 1985 reviewed the "Proposal on Formulating the Seventh Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development" and discussed and established principles for further implementing the transition of members of the central leadership. At the time, over 131 veteran cadres, led by Ye Jianying, "requested" to resign from the Central Committee and elect new members to the three Central Committee committees.
The Fourth Plenum of the 13th Central Committee in 1989, held after the June 4th Incident, marked a major reshuffle of the CCP's leadership.
The Fourth Plenum of the 14th Central Committee in 1994 focused on Party building.
The Fourth Plenum of the 15th Central Committee in 1999 reviewed state-owned enterprise issues but also addressed personnel matters, including the appointment of Hu Jintao as Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission and the removal of Xu Yunhong from his position as alternate member of the Central Committee and his expulsion from the Party.
The Fourth Plenum of the 16th Central Committee in 2004 also focused on Party building, deciding on Hu Jintao's appointment as Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the CCP. Tian Fengshan was removed from his position as a member of the Central Committee and expelled from the Party.
The Fourth Plenum of the 17th Central Committee in 2009 also addressed Party building.
The Fourth Plenum of the 18th Central Committee in 2014, under the theme of rule of law, confirmed the handling of a large number of senior officials, including Li Dongsheng.
The 2019 Fourth Plenary Session of the 19th Central Committee focused on improving national governance. This took place in the aftermath of the anti-extradition movement in Hong Kong. Reports indicate that there were disagreements within the central government regarding the governing policy for Hong Kong.
The only reference point for this year's 20th Central Committee Fourth Plenary Session is the 12th Central Committee Fourth Plenary Session in 1985, which reviewed the Five-Year Plan. A hidden agenda item also included discussions on the principles governing the succession of new and old members of the central leadership. This likely includes the recently circumstantiated rumors about whether Xi Jinping, now a target of public criticism, will step down, when, whether it will be done all at once or in stages, what the format will be, and how his successor will be arranged. Certain principles may need to be established. Of course, these decisions were first agreed upon at the Beidaihe meeting, and then formalized at the Fourth Plenary Session.
Recently, some have claimed that Xi's power is slipping away, while others claim he is delegating power. Both views are plausible. Clearly, people have seen some signs; the difference lies in whether Xi is passive or proactive. If this scenario of relinquishing power exists, Xi Jinping's presiding over a Politburo meeting at the end of June to review the "Regulations on the Work of the Central Decision-making, Deliberative, and Coordinating Bodies" may be related to the new power-sharing plan.
A Beijing friend close to senior officials told me that Xi Jinping, well-versed in power struggles, would not easily concede defeat. His bargain with his political opponents is to step down as General Secretary himself. In exchange, he would nominally remain the de facto supreme leader, just as Deng Xiaoping had done in the past.
At the Fourth Plenary Session of the 12th Central Committee in 1985, Hu Yaobang was a member of the Politburo Standing Committee and General Secretary of the Central Committee. However, the de facto supreme leader of China at the time was Deng Xiaoping, the third-ranked member of the Politburo Standing Committee. Deng Xiaoping was Chairman of the Central Military Commission and controlled the guns.
The Beijing friend stated that if Xi Jinping were to step down as General Secretary and retain his position as Chairman of the Central Military Commission, this position would only be used for publicity purposes, as his authority could not compare to Deng Xiaoping's. Even at the Fourth Plenum, as a condition of the transition between the old and the new, 75-year-old Zhang Youxia and Xi Jinping met in a different kind of "co-death" situation. He also "voluntarily" retired, and the next in line could be Zhang's people. Xi has no stronghold in the military, and the close associates he promoted have been disbanded. However, this situation does not affect the preservation of the Party, because as long as the CCP's interest groups remain viable, they will exploit each other.
A change in the autumn?
In May and July of this year, Xi Jinping visited Henan and Shanxi, but neither time visited a military camp to inspect or offer condolences. In the past, whenever Xi Jinping visited a local government, he would typically visit a military camp to touch guns, take photos, and demonstrate to his political opponents that he possessed weapons for self-defense. This was his second consecutive visit to a local government without visiting a military camp, which was unusual.
On 1 August 2025, the CCP's Army Day, Xi's failure to promote a number of generals to the rank of general also sparked speculation that he was losing power. However, insiders in Beijing said the delay was mainly due to the misfortunes of several generals, the vacuum in the leadership of the Central Military Commission's Political Work Department, and the relative chaos within the military. Insiders say that the grand military parade in Beijing in September was merely a show for the outside world, and doesn't represent Xi's assertion of military power. However, the Fourth Plenary Session of the 19th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in October is crucial, and attention should be paid to the possibility of unexpected transitions between the old and the new, and the possibility of promotions and demotions. This will also provide insights into whether the 2027 leadership transition in the CCP will proceed smoothly. If Xi Jinping's end in power in China is sudden, unexpected, and untimely, it will be a sign of the impending internal revolution. After Xi's departure, the Communist Party's dictatorship may continue for a short period, and his successor will be a ruthless individual who was installed solely to ignite the flames of revolutionary uprising.
Of course, many people currently doubt that China, despite its perilous situation and robust stability maintenance system, will experience a sudden change. The collapse of the former Soviet Union confirms that many events are not subject to conventional wisdom. Therefore, we can at least maintain an open mind and wait and see.
※Author Du Zheng is an independent commentator.
News (2)
On the first day of Beidaihe, an important personnel adjustment quietly took place
Editor: Zhongkang / Source: People's Daily / https://www.aboluowang.com/2025/0805/2257983.html/ Image : Web Screenshot
On 3 August 2025, the CCP's top leadership began their Beidaihe vacation. Official media reports indicate that a significant personnel reshuffle, potentially related to the planning for the 21st National Congress, has quietly taken place.
On 3 August, the official Xinhua News Agency reported that Cai Qi, a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China and Secretary of the Central Secretariat, visited experts on summer vacation in Beidaihe. Shi Taifeng, Minister of the Organization Department of the CPC Central Committee, and State Councilor Chen Yiqin also attended the visit.
It has been noted that Jiang Xinzhi, Vice Chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), who also serves as Executive Vice Minister of the Organization Department of the CPC Central Committee, was not only mentioned in news reports last year but also attended the event with Cai Qi. However, this year, he was not mentioned and did not appear in the group photo. Huang Jianfa, another Vice Minister of the Organization Department of the CPC Central Committee, did appear in the photo, seated in the same position Jiang Xinzhi occupied last year.
A Xinhua News Agency report from 1 July 2025 shows that at a meeting of leading cadres in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, Huang Jianfa, Deputy Minister of the Organization Department of the CPC Central Committee, who assists in daily work, announced the reshuffle of Xinjiang's top leader. Jiang Xinzhi's official title within the Organization Department of the CPC Central Committee is "Deputy Minister in Charge of Daily Work." Some analysts believe that Jiang Xinzhi's work may have been taken over by Huang Jianfa at the time. Jiang Xinzhi's absence from Beidaihe this year suggests the handover is complete.
In April of this year, the Organization Department of the CPC Central Committee and the United Front Work Department swapped leadership positions. The news that Huang Jianfa has succeeded Jiang Xinzhi is confirmed, marking another shift in the most important department responsible for overseeing personnel changes at the top level of the CCP.
Public information indicates that Huang Jianfa, 60, is from Shaowu, Fujian Province. He has worked in the Earthquake Administration for a long time, having served as Director of the Fujian Provincial Earthquake Administration and Director of the Earthquake Emergency Rescue Department of the China Earthquake Administration. In 2010, he was transferred to the Chengdu Municipal Party Committee in Sichuan Province, where he served as Secretary-General of the Chengdu Municipal Party Committee and Minister of the Organization Department of the Sichuan Provincial Party Committee. In 2018, Huang Jianfa moved across provinces to become a member of the Standing Committee and Minister of the Organization Department of the Zhejiang Provincial Party Committee. In 2021, he was promoted to Deputy Secretary of the Provincial Party Committee, and subsequently served as Minister of the Provincial United Front Work Department and Secretary of the Political and Legal Affairs Commission. Media reports in March 2023 indicate that Huang Jianfa had been promoted to Deputy Minister of the Organization Department of the CPC Central Committee.
Kou Jianwen, a distinguished professor at the Institute of East Asian Studies at National Chengchi University in Taiwan who specializes in the CCP's party-state system, told Lianhe Zaobao that Jiang Xinzhi, 67, has already exceeded the 65 retirement age for ministerial-level officials. It's likely that Jiang has remained in office due to his CPPCC position, making a handover at this stage unsurprising.
Kou Jianwen further analyzed that Huang Jianfa's promotion to Shi Taifeng's first deputy may be a preemptive move in preparation for the 21st National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in two years. "Before the 21st National Congress, leadership changes will take place from central ministries to local governments, and sprucing up the Organization Department, which oversees personnel management, is part of this."
News (3)
Zhang Youxia's lavish gambling! Rumor has it that a veteran's move will force Xi to retire without a plan
Reporter : Wang Duruo / Editor : Fang Xun / https://www.aboluowang.com/2025/0806/2258314.html
The political situation at the top of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) remains murky. Independent scholar Wu Zuolai revealed on 3 August 2025 that Liu Yuan, a second-generation Red Guard, recently left Beijing to coordinate with Zhang Youxia's deployments across the country to prevent the two from being "caught in one net" in the same city and a fatal purge in the event of a coup. He implied that this move mirrored Deng Xiaoping's deployments during his southern tour, with the core objective being "the gun must be in one's own hands."
Wu Zuolai pointed out that the CCP's top leadership is planning to keep Xi Jinping in office pending retirement to ensure a "smooth transition" and maintain political stability. If the Fourth Plenum in October successfully resolves the Xi issue, Zhang Youxia may choose to retire to avoid the new leader's fear of his military power.
Commentator Li Dayu analyzed that the movements of Zhang and Liu reveal three key messages:
First, Zhang Youxia faces high risks in overthrowing Xi, and he must assume control of the military. Liu Yuan's deployments are a tactic Zhang Youxia has adopted to secure his military control but Liu does not possess the actual power to mobilize the military unless authorized by Zhang.
Second, the "stay-at-home" policy, ostensibly a gentle transition, is actually a power trade intended to secure a complete retirement for Xi and his cronies. Zhang is willing to relinquish power solely to protect his own safety and avoid a repeat of Hu Jintao's expulsion from the 20th National Congress.
Third, Zhang had previously escaped Xi Jinping's purge of the Rocket Force but his current "retirement in exchange for retirement" is a desperate gamble.
Second-generation Reds have revealed that Zhang Youxia's authority in the military is comparable to that of Deng Xiaoping. He recently led large-scale military exercises in Zhangjiakou, with Xi Jinping unable to intervene. This is intended to send a signal that the "gun commands the party," indicating that Zhang will not hesitate to "turn the tables" if high-level personnel decisions threaten his safety.
The CCP's top leadership is currently caught in a struggle among four factions:
1. Red-Maoists: These support the Maoist line, comprising the Xi faction and remnants of the Jiang faction. They advocate a "partial retirement" with Xi Jinping taking over behind-the-scenes power.
2. Political Reformists: Represented by Wang Yang and Li Ruihuan, they advocate Wang Yang taking over and promoting political reform.
3. Party Conservationists: The Hu Jintao faction, which strongly supports Hu Chunhua and opposes political reform, seeking only to rectify mistakes and maintain stability.
4. Militaryists: Zhang Youxia and Liu Yuan, who are not betting on anyone and insist that "Xi must fully retire and not be allowed to overthrow him."
Zhang and Liu's insecurity stems from the factions' inability to reach a consensus and the urgency of time. Previously, former prominent Beijing journalist Gao Yu revealed that Liu Yuan had left Beijing to avoid suspicion.
Former Chinese Navy Lieutenant Colonel Yao Cheng revealed on August 4th in a self-media post that the Chinese military has fully entered a phase of coordinated and joint training between military services, led by Zhang Youxia himself, with no opportunity for Xi Jinping to intervene.
Commentator Tang Jingyuan analyzed that if Hu Jintao were to "restore order," it would quickly legitimize the overthrow of Xi Jinping. However, the current biggest disagreement between those who support political reform and those who support the Party lies in the dispute between Wang Yang and Hu Chunhua, creating a difficult-to-break deadlock. Ultimately, the military's stance may become a watershed in determining whether the Party will be "preserved" in the post-Xi era.
Li Dayu predicted that if the intra-party struggles reach a dead end, it is possible someone will eventually resort to "abandoning the Party" to put an end to the deadlock in power struggles within the CCP system.
However, Aboluowang commentator Wang Duran stated that Wu Zuolai has profound observations of CCP politics and has written a series of short essays, many of which have been interpreted as fact by overseas commentators. However, Wu Zuolai has not demonstrated any internal sources, let alone military sources, in recent years. Therefore, I believe that Mr. Wu's revelations are, in essence, political analysis, but they still hold valuable reference value amidst the current political uncertainty.
News (4)
Strange! After the shooting incident in the Central Theater Command, the commander remains a mystery
Reporter : Sun Ruihou / Editor : Fang Xun / https://www.aboluowang.com/2025/0806/2258411.html / Image : Web Screenshot
According to the Liaoning Daily, on 1 August 2025, a military-political symposium celebrating the August 1st anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China was held in Liaoning Province, with "major leaders of the Northern Theater Command attending and delivering speeches." However, the report only mentioned Northern Theater Command Political Commissar Zheng Xuan, without mentioning Commander Huang Ming. In May 2025, social media circulated that Huang Ming had been taken into custody for investigation.
Commentator Li Yanming analyzed that Huang Ming has a complex military background. He rose to prominence in the 16th Group Army, a direct lineage of the now-disgraced former Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) Xu Caihou; he was a former subordinate of the Shenyang Military Region under current Vice Chairman of the CMC Zhang Youxia; and his career was promoted by the now-disgraced Directors of the CMC's Political Work Department, Zhang Yang, and Miao Hua.
Current Vice Chairman of the CMC Zhang Youxia served as Commander of the Shenyang Military Region for five years, from September 2007 to October 2012. During this period, Huang Ming served as Commander of a mechanized division in the Shenyang Military Region.
It's worth noting that Xu Caihou, the former Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission who has since died of illness, served as Director of the Political Department and Political Commissar of the 16th Group Army. Huang Ming's superior in the 16th Group Army, Gao Guanghui, was a close confidant of Xu Caihou. After Xu Caihou's downfall, Gao Guanghui was demoted and rumors of an investigation surfaced.
At the time, there were also reports that after Xu Caihou's downfall, several secretaries were purged and dozens of generals were investigated. These included Gao Guanghui, the former commander of the 16th Army; Hou Shusen, Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Communist Party of China and former Chief of Staff of the Shenyang Military Region; and Kang Xiaohui, Political Commissar of the Joint Logistics Department of the Shenyang Military Region.
Huang Ming's career appears to have been unaffected by the Xu Caihou case. He was promoted to Major General in July 2014 and then, in July 2016, he was promoted across military regions to Commander of the 41st Group Army of the Guangzhou Military Region. Less than a year later, in March 2017, he was transferred to Commander of the 81st Group Army of the Central Theater Command.
At the time, Fan Changlong was the First Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, and Xu Qiliang was the Second Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, responsible for political work. Zhang Yang, a member of the Central Military Commission and Director of the General Political Department, was in charge of selecting senior military officers. Fang Fenghui also served as a member of the Central Military Commission and Chief of the General Staff.
Miao Hua began serving as Director of the Political Work Department of the Central Military Commission in August 2017, responsible for the political assessment and selection of senior military officers. Subsequently, Huang Ming was promoted to Deputy Commander of the Army in June 2019, then to Lieutenant General in December 2019, and transferred to Chief of Staff of the Army in September 2021. In January 2023, Huang Ming was promoted to Commander of the Central Theater Command and promoted to General.
Li Yanming explained that Huang Ming, after serving as Commander of the Central Theater Command for a year and a half, was transferred to Commander of the Northern Theater Command at the end of July 2024. This was a sensitive timing, coinciding with the conclusion of the Third Plenum and the eve of the Beidaihe meeting. Shortly after Huang Ming's transfer, reports of a shooting occurred in the Central Theater Command. The Central Theater Command holds a unique position among the five major theater commands of the Chinese Communist Party, shouldering the crucial task of defending Beijing. Both the Central Theater Command headquarters and the Central Theater Command Air Force are based in Beijing. Strangely, a year after Huang Ming's transfer, the next commander of the Central Theater Command remains a mystery.
News (5) to (6) / Report by : Jiu Tianjian / Editor: Li Guangsong / Source: Epoch Times / https://www.aboluowang.com/2025/0807/2258710.html / Image : In late July 2025, heavy rains hit many parts of China, causing many deaths and disappearances. (Screenshot from the Internet)
News (5)
Red Alert: Party leader, 72, faces grave danger
2025 is truly a catastrophic year. Even for atheist senior CCP officials, especially Party leader Xi Jinping, it's a very stressful time.
With the arrival of midsummer, ominous signs are becoming increasingly apparent. In addition to the century-long high temperatures, torrential rains have hit various regions, and flash floods, coupled with unwarned reservoir releases, have caused numerous major disasters, resulting in incalculable loss of life and property, and boiling public resentment.
On 28 July 2025, Xi Jinping, unable to contain himself, issued a rare statement regarding the continued heavy rainfall in East China, North China, and Northeast China, which has triggered floods and geological disasters. He specifically mentioned the significant casualties and property losses in Beijing, Hebei, Jilin and Shandong.
In the three years since 2022, Xi Jinping has rarely spoken out on anything, aside from reducing his travels, retreating from the political arena, and keeping a low profile in the face of various unfavorable rumors at home and abroad. This suggests that the series of major disasters and the resulting massive loss of life have had a profound impact on him.
Otherwise, Xi would not have ordered officials across the country to "firmly establish bottom-line thinking and extreme limits" to ensure prompt response and handling of emergencies, fully safeguarding the lives and property of the people.
He cannot afford to lose. With the people already facing siege on all sides and their livelihoods in dire straits, the prospect of a catastrophe and rioting by the victims would be truly unpleasant.
However, the celestial phenomena does not align with Xi's will.
Since late July, for the past two weeks, the heavens have seemed intently against the Chinese Communist Party. Torrential rain and floods have continued, one wave after another washing over the Chinese landscape. Residents in many northern provinces and cities can now enjoy the ocean without leaving their homes. Well, they're completely covered, and leaving without a rubber boat is impossible. Watching the video, a courageous man crawls through waist-deep floodwaters, holding instant noodles and water above his head. I'm truly worried for this reckless man.
An 80-year-old Beijing resident exclaimed, "I've never seen such prolonged torrential rain, or such devastating flooding in my entire life, the capital."
Forget about the elderly. I've lived in the imperial capital for decades, and I've never seen such relentless behavior from the heavens. It's like divine punishment! Could it be that the heavens are joining in with Trump's sanctions against the CCP?
The CCP meteorological department's unprecedented issuance of red high temperature and red rainstorm warnings shocked me.
It is no exaggeration to say that within the memory of anyone living in the imperial capital, including me, Beijing has never issued a red alert. After Jiang Zemin's crackdown on Falun Gong in 1999, heaven was furious, and a sandstorm blanketed Beijing, a spectacle never seen under post-1949 Communist rule! Even then, only an orange alert was issued.
Now, the torrential rain is relentless, and the floods are raging. What a lifetime!
Flooding in nine districts and counties is bizarre enough, especially the fact that it even flooded the Forbidden City. To modern eyes, it seems like a fairy tale. No one would believe it without seeing the video!
The Forbidden City has existed for over 600 years, and it's never been flooded this badly. While it flooded occasionally, it wasn't sustainable. The rain simply washed away the ancients' divine drainage system.
I have never seen flooding as bizarre as today's. In my opinion, it is simply because Mao Zedong's morgue has been suppressing the central dragon vein for nearly 50 years, bringing misfortune upon the Communist Party and dragging it to hell.
News (6)
No wonder rumors are circulating: "Flooding the Forbidden City is a disaster for Xi Jinping."
Chinese Premier Li Qiang followed his boss's lead, first acknowledging the heavy rain and flooding disaster in Miyun, Beijing, which caused significant casualties. He then instructed the State Flood Control and Drought Relief Headquarters to provide guidance to its subordinates on extreme weather monitoring and early warning.
Less than a week after Xi Jinping and Li Qiang's words, another divine rebuke arrived: Another red alert!
At 6 am on 4 August 2025, the Central Meteorological Observatory issued warnings for heavy to torrential rain across many parts of the country, including Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei, Guangxi, and Guangdong, with torrential rain expected in some areas, and particularly torrential rain in some areas. Meanwhile, southern North China, the Huanghuai region, and other areas are experiencing high temperatures, with temperatures exceeding 40°C in parts of central and southern Shaanxi and the Sichuan Basin. Furthermore, a red alert for high temperatures has been issued in Wuhan, Hubei, while five districts, including Fangshan District in Beijing, have upgraded their warnings to red alerts for heavy rain.
According to the China Meteorological Administration's classification system, a red alert is issued when temperatures reach 40°C; a red alert for heavy rain is issued when rainfall reaches 100 mm within three hours, or has reached 100 mm and is likely to continue.
As the saying goes, fire and water are merciless. From the persistent high temperatures and droughts across China to the current torrential rains, the catastrophic consequences are crop failure and loss of life. With so many years of crop failure, the Chinese Communist Party has long been accustomed to the "too many lice to bite" mentality. It can afford to spend money to buy food, but the problem becomes more complex when too many deaths occur.
The Beijing Municipal Government held a press conference on 31 July 2025, confirming that the city's disaster-related death toll has reached 44, with another 9 missing. Most tragically, 31 elderly residents of a nursing home in Taishitun Town, Miyun District, were denied assistance during the floods and drowned.
Over 50 people died or went missing after a heavy rain in Beijing, the capital of Beijing, largely due to the Miyun Reservoir's unannounced flood release on the 27th. This kind of brutal disregard for civilian lives is unmatched by any government other than the Communist Party.
This unprecedented and disastrous outcome sparked immense public outrage, forcing Beijing Party Secretary Yin Li to take leave from the Politburo meeting on the 30th to conduct an inspection tour of the suburbs, where he pledged to "conduct in-depth reflection and review."
I want to ask: Secretary Yin, what were you thinking when you didn't notify the public before the flood release? Didn't you know that the Miyun Reservoir release would drown? Can people be resurrected afterward? Don't tell the public you forgot to notify them. If your father were in that nursing home, would you forget? Would your Miyun Party Secretary forget?
The CCP's Work Safety Law stipulates that one of the criteria for a major accident is a death toll of 30.
The outside world believes that, given the CCP's history of lying and concealing casualties, the official report of 53 dead and missing persons is likely false.
Even foreigners are now familiar with the CCP's tactics of treating funerals as ceremonial, making light of them, and shifting the blame.
As everyone knows, getting the CCP to admit that its self-proclaimed "great, glorious, and correct" totalitarian system has committed grave crimes and harmed the people is harder than ascending to heaven.
It blames everything on unfavorable fate, and in the internet age, it is being relentlessly pursued by victims, and unable to bear the consequences, it has resorted to sacrificing its henchmen. It's likely that Secretary Yin will take the blame for Xi Jinping this time to appease public anger.
Looking at the vast expanse of the world, this is simply a new version of the story of God's destruction of the CCP.
I have a random discovery to share with readers.
Yin Junke, former deputy director of the Institute of History at the Beijing Academy of Social Sciences, found, based on historical data, that in the years of Renchen and Guisi, the probability of flooding in Beijing is as high as 80%.
Mr. Yin's discovery was unfortunately confirmed. Twelve years ago, 2013 was the Year of the Snake (Yi Si). Xi Jinping had just taken office as General Secretary of the Communist Party of China, but fate dealt this sixty-year-old man, who had just celebrated his 60th birthday, a blow. Torrential rains in southwest China resulted in official announcements of 46 deaths and 166 missing persons. Floods inundated 284 counties in 21 provinces and cities, affecting 6.749 million people.
The ancients believed that a 12-year cycle constituted a single era. 2025 is the Year of the Snake (Yi Si), Xi Jinping's zodiac year. Exactly 72 years have passed since the June floods in Beijing in the year of his birth.
In 1953, Beijing's rainfall was 70% above average. Flooding affected 1.02 million mu (approximately 1.3 acres), with the most severe damage occurring in Tong County, Daxing County, and Fangshan District.
This summer's red alert is even more frightening. Beijing officials declared, "This torrential rain is unprecedented in history!" The inflow of rainwater into Miyun Reservoir reached 6,550 cubic metres per second, twice the highest recorded rate. It could fill Kunming Lake in the Summer Palace in just five minutes.
This extreme astronomical phenomenon is rare in Beijing's history. Neither I nor anyone in the capital has ever seen it, nor has Xi Jinping. It is hard not to be anxious.
As the saying goes, it is rare for a person to live to be seventy.
We know that Confucius lived to be seventy-three, and Mencius lived to be eighty-four. Therefore, later generations believe that these two sages' longevity was not in vain. Seventy-three and eighty-four are definitely two "tough times" in life. This leads to another proverb: "At seventy-three and eighty-four, the King of Hell won't call you to go."
Mao Zedong, born in the Year of the Snake, died at the age of eighty-three, not even reaching eighty-four. A meteor shower recently rained down from Jilin, including three large rocks. Knowing his impending death, Mao murmured to his female nurse, Meng Jinyun, "When large rocks fall from the sky, it means someone is going to die."
Mao Zedong is Xi Jinping's idol, and everyone knows it. Around April of this year, large fireballs fell several times, accompanied by loud noises. Could this be a replay of Mao's premonitions before his death?
Fellow Chinese zodiac sign, Xi Jinping will be 72 this year. Whether he can survive until 73 depends on his fate.
Since his birth in 1972, he has experienced two major floods in the capital. This is no coincidence. I advise Xi Jinping to stop his foolish acts against Buddhism, as Heaven will not turn a blind eye. The Beijing Red Alert is a preview of this.
News (7) to (8) / Report by : Lin Baohua / Editor: Li Guangsong / https://www.aboluowang.com/2025/0807/2258814.html / Image : Web Screenshot
News (7)
The CCP's "Xi Core" emerges on Army Day
This year's August 1st marks the 98th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese People's Liberation Army. A significant difference is that while a military rank-awarding ceremony was held on July 9th last year, honoring those promoted to general, this year's ceremony was absent. This suggests that the generals are still choosing sides and will wait until the intra-Party struggle concludes before awards are given based on their performance. However, some have already fallen from grace, such as Miao Hua, Director of the Political Work Department, who attended the reception last year. It was also reported that seven generals in Beijing were absent. At the local level, General Huang Ming, Commander of the Northern Theater Command, also failed to appear at the symposium. Huang Ming was promoted to Major General in July 2014, Lieutenant General in December 2019, and General in January 2023. His rapid rise in recent years suggests he was promoted by Xi Jinping.
Surprisingly, Defense Minister Dong Jun's speech suddenly included the phrase, "We will unite more closely around the Party Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping at its core." This once popular political term gradually faded a year ago, reflecting subtle shifts in the CCP's political landscape. What's the reason for its resurrection now? Common sense suggests that: 1. Xi Jinping's counterattack was successful; 2. The old slogans were brought out for revolutionary purposes.
Please continue reading...
Since many of the missing generals were Xi Jinping's favorites, and they should have reappeared, it can be inferred that Xi Jinping's counterattack has not yet been successful. Therefore, the "Xi core" must be brought out again for "revolutionary purposes." As for this revolutionary need, there are two main reasons:
First, the September 3rd military parade is approaching. The CCP claims to be the "mainstay" of the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, so a military parade is essential to showcase its military prowess. Who will conduct the parade? Until Xi Jinping steps down, he can only review it. However, rumors of Xi Jinping's instability are rampant in China, so the "Xi core" is being brought out again to stabilize military and public morale, pending the Fourth Plenary Session of the 19th Central Committee in October.
Second, the Hudson Institute, a U.S. think tank where China expert Miles Yu Maochun works, has drafted a lengthy paper on how to handle the CCP's aftermath, a development that has shocked China. This necessitates the CCP's posture of "uniting to jointly fight the enemy," framing itself as united around Xi Jinping's core in order to suppress the rebellious attempts of class enemies, both domestically and internationally.
Whatever the reason, given China's current political and economic situation, adding more cores is useless, as many problems are caused by them. Even if a paper core were constructed today, it would collapse at the slightest gust of wind. Sleeping and eating are already unsettling in the turbulent Beidaihe, let alone "working" out policies and guidelines to save the nation and the people during meetings.
News (8)
Kuomintang continues to be bewildered by the CCP while Trump desires to see Xi's situation
The Kuomintang's "center of sympathy for bandits" has now become a "center of affection for family members," bewildered by the "involution" of the Communist Party, witnessing the plight of its own "family members." As for Trump's frequent expressions of concern for Xi Jinping, even his desire to visit Beijing, it is simply a desire to personally witness Xi Jinping's current situation: Is he deserted by his friends and family or is he suffering from a terminal illness that has left him listless? Therefore, Beijing has been hesitant to agree to a Trump visit, unless it were to parade and help the Communist Party.
China's problem is not Xi Jinping's personal problem, but the problem of the entire Communist Party. As long as the Communist Party exists, the banner of "anti-communism and defending Taiwan" will be held high and never lowered. Meanwhile, the Kuomintang clings to the CCP's leg, even acting as the vanguard of the Communist Party's anti-US campaign. Like the Hong Kong SAR government, are they seeking to be sacrificed?
News (9)
Trump personally confirmed Vance is the most likely successor in 2028
Editor : Fang Xun / Source: China Times News Network / https://www.aboluowang.com/2025/0806/2258435.html / Image of Vance : File photo
On 5 August 2025, U.S. President Trump said Vice President J.D. Vance is his likely successor for the 2028 Republican presidential nomination, his most explicit endorsement yet of Vance. Asked whether Vance was the obvious choice given his "America First" campaign, Trump replied, "I think it's very likely. He's the vice president, to be fair."
Trump also suggested that Vance and Secretary of State Marco Rubio could form a future Republican general election team.
Although the 2028 presidential election is still several years away, Trump holds immense influence among Republican grassroots, making his endorsement of any candidate significant. Trump has previously declined to endorse a 2028 candidate. In February, he called Vance "very capable," but said at the time that it was premature to nominate him as a leading candidate.
Vance, a former Marine, has played a key role in the Trump administration, serving as a key diplomat and chief spokesperson, actively promoting Trump's domestic and foreign policies. Vance grew up in poverty in Ohio, raised primarily by his grandparents. He was driven and ambitious, eventually graduating from the Ivy League Yale Law School. He later wrote about his struggles and rise in the book, "Hillbilly Elegy," which reached the New York Times bestseller list in 2016 and 2017. Now 40, despite serving as Trump's running mate, he is widely considered a rising star in the Republican Party, unlike previous, almost silent vice presidents.
On the other hand, Rubio, a former Florida senator, is a key figure in the Trump administration, exceptionally skilled in navigating complex diplomatic challenges. He is the first cabinet official since former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to serve simultaneously as Secretary of State and National Security Advisor.
News (10)
Putin compromises with Trump; Russia plans ceasefire in Ukrainian airspace
Editor: Fang Xun / Source: Central News Agency / https://www.aboluowang.com/2025/0806/2258405.html / Image of Putin : File photo
Bloomberg reports that with the August 8 deadline for US sanctions against Russia approaching, the Kremlin is considering an "air ceasefire" with Ukraine as a possible compromise measure in response to US secondary tariff sanctions.
U.S. Special Envoy Steve Witkoff is expected to visit Russia this week, arriving as early as today, and may meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin. The report, citing sources familiar with the matter, suggests that while the likelihood of a US-Russia agreement is low, Russia may make some last-minute concessions, including a halt to air strikes such as missiles and drones, as a gesture to de-escalate the situation.
However, given Russia's unchanged strategic objectives and its current advantage on the battlefield, Putin is not expected to agree to a full ceasefire. The report also notes that while Kyiv has repeatedly expressed its willingness to accept an unconditional ceasefire, it remains uncertain whether Ukraine and its allies would accept a limited ceasefire.
Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov stated that Russia values engagement with the U.S. but would not comment before the talks.
Sergei Markov, a Moscow-based political analyst, noted, "Trump needs a gift, and that's Russia's compromise." He believes an airspace ceasefire could be a suitable option.
U.S. President Donald Trump originally gave Russia a 50-day deadline in July, but later shortened it to Friday (8th), saying he did not believe Russia would take it seriously. Trump recently warned that if Putin did not agree to negotiate by the deadline, he would impose secondary tariffs of at least 500% on products from countries trading with Russia, putting pressure on Russia and its allies, specifically targeting China and India.
Trump recently criticized India for purchasing large quantities of Russian oil and profiting on the open market, which would significantly increase the tariffs India pays to the US. Andriy Yermak, chief of staff of the Ukrainian presidential office, announced yesterday that Indian parts were found in attack drones used by Russia. Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko also mentioned the idea of an airspace ceasefire on the 1st, but Putin did not respond at the time. Lukashenko reportedly met with US envoy Keith Kellogg in June, and it is likely that relevant discussions took place at that time.
Ukrainian Pravda, citing a source in the Ukrainian presidential office, also reported that Kellogg is expected to visit Kyiv this week and hold talks with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.
Ukraine and Russia still have significant differences over the terms of the ceasefire. Russia has demanded that Ukrainian troops withdraw from four oblasts: Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson. Ukraine, on the other hand, has reiterated its unwavering commitment to maintaining its territorial integrity.
The two countries held three rounds of talks in Istanbul this year, but failed to reach a ceasefire agreement. However, both sides agreed to exchange prisoners and remains. Kyiv later proposed a summit meeting before the end of August. Zelensky recently stated that he had reached a preliminary agreement with Russia on a new round of prisoner exchange involving 1,200 prisoners, but the specific list is still being negotiated.
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