Direct translation
Wu Zuolai: The trial of Xu Qinxian is actually a trial of Deng Xiaoping and a warning to Xi Jinping
Commentator : Wu Zuolai / Editor: Jiang Yi Source: CNR Rti / https://www.aboluowang.com/2025/1201/2313447.html / Image : Footage of the trial of Xu Qinxian, the "disobedient general" of the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests, has been released. (Screenshot from the video)
The 1989 commemoration of Hu Yaobang's death sparked a nationwide pro-democracy movement in China. The CCP authorities characterized the movement as a "turmoil," and Deng Xiaoping mobilized troops to Beijing to suppress it. At the time, only Major General Xu Qinxian, commander of the 38th Army, refused to sign the troop mobilization order and was subsequently secretly sentenced by the authorities. Wu Renhua, a participant in and expert on the 1989 pro-democracy movement and a former lecturer at China University of Political Science and Law, released the full video of Xu Qinxian's trial in a military court on November 25th on an overseas X platform.
Xu Qinxian's trial took place on March 17, 1990, in the courtroom of a military court in Beijing. Wu Renhua explained, “Xu Qinxian’s refusal to lead troops into Beijing to suppress the rebellion shocked Deng Xiaoping and Yang Shangkun. Xu Qinxian was immediately dismissed from his position as army commander, and the General Political Department’s Security Department was ordered to arrest him. He was tried by a military court and sentenced to five years in prison. Xu Qinxian served his sentence in Qincheng Prison and was then placed in Shijiazhuang City, Hebei Province. He passed away on January 8, 2021, at the age of 86.”
Wu Renhua stated on the X platform, “This video recording of General Xu Qinxian’s trial is extremely valuable; it is arguably the most important material I have obtained in over thirty years of collecting materials on the June Fourth Incident. Obtaining this video recording of General Xu Qinxian’s trial was very difficult and carried considerable political risk.”
We not only thank Mr. Wu Renhua for his initial release but also thank the key person who risked great danger to obtain the video of Xu Qinxian’s trial from the CCP’s top-secret database.
The latest personnel appointment and removal announcement from the State Council shows that the director and deputy director of the State Council’s Secrecy Bureau were simultaneously dismissed, which may be related to the leak of this video, as both directors had not yet completed their terms. The video's release overseas caused a strong shockwave among the top echelons of the CCP. It not only exposed the sinister nature of the CCP's backroom politics of the past but also highlighted the noble character of Commander Xu Qinxian. While the video was essentially a trial of Deng Xiaoping, it directly targeted Xi Jinping.
The trial documents highlight Xu Qinxian's great character
This is the main content of the military court's judgment against Xu Qinxian. It is not merely a judgment document, but a eulogy worthy of being recorded in history, a testament to the great character of a soldier loyal to the country and the people. Therefore, I have transcribed the key points below:
At approximately 4:00 PM on May 18, 1989, Liu Zhenhua, Political Commissar of the Beijing Military Region (Commander Zhou Yibing was attending an emergency meeting convened by higher authorities at the time), and other leaders conveyed the Central Military Commission's order to Xu Qinxian in the conference room on the third floor of the main building of the military region's office building regarding the transfer of the 38th Group Army to Beijing to carry out martial law duties.
After Political Commissar Liu and other military region leaders conveyed the Central Military Commission's order and deployment, Xu Qinxian immediately refused to lead his troops to Beijing to carry out martial law duties. He said that such a major undertaking as mobilizing the military should be discussed at a plenary meeting of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress and the State Council. Was it appropriate to do so? Such an order should be issued by the state; issuing it in the name of the Party was inappropriate.
He added that such actions must withstand the test of history. An event may not be immediately clear, but history will prove that carrying out such a mission could lead to merit or condemnation. He declared, "I cannot carry out such a mission with weapons. The Central Military Commission can appoint me as army commander, or it can dismiss me. I cannot carry out such an order. Please find someone else."
Under the stern criticism and instructions of the military region leadership, Xu Qin first went to the military region's operations duty room and used a secure telephone to convey the Central Military Commission's order to Wang Fuyi, the political commissar of the group army. He told Wang, "I disagree with this method. I cannot carry out this order. I cannot command. You decide who commands."
The judgment stated: Xu Qinxian's act of disobeying the Central Military Commission's martial law order interfered with the leadership's deployment of martial law tasks, fueled the arrogance of rioters and instigators, increased the difficulty for troops to enter the city to carry out martial law tasks, seriously damaged the political reputation of our army, and caused a negative political impact both domestically and internationally. As the commander of an army group, the defendant Xu Qinxian, at a critical moment for the life and death of the Party and the country, disobeyed orders on the front lines, seriously endangering the interests of the Party and the country; the nature of his actions was egregious, and the consequences were severe.
Demonstrating Xu Qinxian's great character and clear understanding of history and current politics
The trial document explains why Xu refused martial law: "For such a major event as deploying the army, I suggest that it be discussed at a plenary meeting of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress and the State Council… Such an order should be issued by the state; it is inappropriate to issue it in the name of the Party." Strictly speaking, this was not a martial law order issued by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, but rather a decision made by Deng Xiaoping, Yang Shangkun, and a few others, as corroborated by their later published memoirs.
Secondly, Xu Qinxian said: "Such actions must withstand the test of history… Carrying out such a task may bring merit, or it may make one a historical sinner." He also said: "I cannot carry out such an order… Please ask the leaders to find someone else."
This shows that this army commander who refused to carry out martial law was responsible to history and the people, preferring to lose his position rather than point guns at the demonstrating students and citizens. If the high-ranking military officials at the time had possessed such character, the June Fourth tragedy would not have occurred, and Deng Xiaoping would not have become a historical sinner.
Xu Qinxian possessed a clear understanding of the relationship between politics and the military: In the video, he discussed how to resolve the predicament at the time, initially suggesting it should be resolved through the Politburo, the Central Military Commission, and the State Council. He further argued that the military, now integrated into the national system, required discussion by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress to conform to the CCP's self-proclaimed principles of scientific decision-making and democratic centralism. He asserted that the decisions made by Deng Xiaoping's clique were, in essence, a military-led coup.
The trial of Xu Qinxian was, in effect, a trial of Deng Xiaoping
The more than six-hour trial, through the testimonies of Xu Qinxian and witnesses, aimed to reveal Deng Xiaoping's true nature: Why couldn't Xu Qinxian obtain formal written orders? Because the "April 26 Editorial" was Deng Xiaoping's verbal instruction characterizing the students' and citizens' commemoration of Hu Yaobang, and the decision to declare martial law was similarly an overreach of power made by Deng Xiaoping in a secret room.
In his memoir, "Farewell to the General Staff," Luo Yu, son of former Chief of the General Staff Luo Ruiqing and a division-level cadre in the General Staff, recounted that after the order to fire was drafted, it was first sent to Yang Shangkun, the Executive Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, while the First Vice Chairman was Zhao Ziyang. Yang Shangkun said, "Send it to Deng first; if Deng doesn't sign it, I won't sign it." So the order was sent to Deng Xiaoping first, for Deng to sign first, and then Yang to sign. Xu Qinxian refused to carry it out on the grounds that the First Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, Zhao Ziyang, had not signed it, making the order incomplete, illegal, and unenforceable.
Therefore, this was a political trial, and the charges against him were baseless and laughable.
Deng Xiaoping's use of the military to resolve political issues was a coup d'état led by a military clique; protecting the Party was a pretense, protecting the interests of a small group was the real purpose.
Around June Fourth, the true center of power was not the Politburo, but the "elderly clique" within Deng Xiaoping's family. Li Peng's "June Fourth Diary" records that key meetings were held at Deng's home, with participants including Deng Xiaoping, Yang Shangkun, Li Peng, Chen Yun, Bo Yibo, and other elders; Zhao Ziyang was excluded. Zhao Ziyang's downfall was decided in these secret meetings and then ratified by the Politburo.
Chen Yun not only nominated Jiang Zemin but also suggested that "each member of a red family should hold a vice-ministerial position," as evidenced by Deng Pufang's later appointment as chairman of the China Disabled Persons' Federation (a vice-ministerial level position). History records who profited from the blood of the victims of the June Fourth Incident.
A warning and rebuke to Xi Jinping
The unexpected release of Xu Qinxian's trial video is shocking not only because it reveals the truth but also because it serves as a warning against the current re-centralization of power. Xu questioned whether military power can supersede legal procedures. This is precisely the most sensitive issue in the Xi Jinping era.
First, major military and diplomatic decisions must be nationalized, not paternalistic. Abandoning the "hide your strength and bide your time" policy and policies towards the US and Russia are matters of national destiny and should be discussed jointly by the Politburo, the State Council, and the National People's Congress; if decided in secret by a very small group, their legitimacy is questionable.
Second, the Central Military Commission Chairman responsibility system cannot "only ask about loyalty, not responsibility." Xi's rocket-like promotion of generals over the past decade has led to widespread systemic corruption. If the responsibility is not borne by the Chairman of the Central Military Commission, the so-called "responsibility system" is empty talk. Deng Xiaoping controlled party power through the Central Military Commission Chairman system, but Xi has gone even further, with more concentrated power and fewer checks and balances.
Third, major issues such as Taiwan's preparedness for war, the South China Sea, and the Sino-Indian conflict must have traceable decision-making procedures. Xu Qinxian's statement that "history will be the judge" is a warning against the potential for extreme nationalism today.
Fourth, the object of loyalty must be redefined. Xu Qinxian demonstrated through his actions that loyalty to the people is above loyalty to one person. When "loyalty to the core" conflicts with national interests, history will ultimately judge who is truly loyal.
Fifth, Xu Qinxian's statement about "being responsible to history" is a timeless warning from military personnel. The officers and soldiers of the People's Liberation Army, who eat the people's food and wear the people's clothes, should not betray the people for temporary power and position, ultimately being nailed to the pillar of historical shame.
Therefore, this trial video, sealed for 34 years, serves as a stark warning about the boundaries of today's system and power. Condemning Deng Xiaoping's Tiananmen Square massacre also reminds us that while Deng Xiaoping's 1992 Southern Tour could correct course, Xi Jinping shows no sign of turning back on the path of totalitarianism. His support for Russia's invasion of Ukraine, as well as his intimidation of Taiwan and Japan, are all worrying.
Having abandoned the policy of "keeping a low profile," Xi Jinping is using the national strength accumulated through reform and opening up. If he were to launch a war abroad, the destructive consequences would far exceed the catastrophic consequences of the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown.
Author Wu Zuolai is an independent scholar and columnist. His published works on literature and history include *Culture is a River*, *A Perspective on Classical Chinese Art*, and the "Lao Tzu and Confucius Classroom Series" .
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