Is Xi Jinping worried that anti-Japanese sentiment will turn into anti-CCP sentiment?

Edited translation

The storm is intensifying! Will anti-Japanese sentiment in China turn into anti-government sentiment?

—Cheng Xi: The storm is intensifying! Is Xi Jinping worried that anti-Japanese sentiment will turn into anti-government sentiment?

Reporter : Cheng Xi / Editor: Fang Xun / Source: People's Daily / https://www.aboluowang.com/2025/1121/2308539.html / Image : Aboluowang

The storm sparked by Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi's "Taiwan crisis" remarks and Chinese Communist Consul General in Osaka Xue Jian's "decapitation" rhetoric has brought Sino-Japanese relations to a freezing point, and this storm continues to escalate.

In the past, friction between CCP China and Japan has occurred repeatedly, with large-scale protests and anti-Japanese sentiment erupting domestically under the guidance of Chinese propaganda.

However, some analysts believe that the Xi Jinping regime's biggest concern is that anti-Japanese sentiment could escalate into anti-CCP government sentiment.

On 20 November 2025, He Yongqian, spokesperson for the Chinese Communist Ministry of Commerce, stated that if Japan persists in its erroneous course, CCP China will resolutely take necessary measures, and Japan will bear all the consequences.

According to multiple Japanese media reports, the Chinese Communist government began suspending import procedures for Japanese seafood on 19 November.

However, China did not directly notify Japan of the import suspension, but instead used the reason of "suspending imports of parts that have not completed inspections."

Chinese Communist Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning stated that "under the current circumstances, even if Japanese seafood were exported to China, there would be no market."

Beijing's restrictions on seafood imports have left Japanese fishermen remarkably unfazed.

Following Beijing's comprehensive ban on Japanese seafood imports in August 2023, citing the issue of wastewater discharge from the Fukushima nuclear plant, Japanese seafood exports to markets outside China have continued to expand. Scallops, the largest category, have long since broken free from dependence on China, and their wholesale price in Japan has more than doubled.

According to the Liberty Times, before the Chinese embargo, 50% of Japanese scallops were exported to China, primarily for shelling and freezing before being re-exported to markets like the United States.

In 2022, total exports reached 91.1 billion yen, with China accounting for 51.3% and the United States only 8.6%.

After the Chinese embargo in August 2023, total exports dropped to 68.9 billion yen, with China accounting for 37.6%.

In 2024, total exports reached 69.5 billion yen, with the United States accounting for 27.5%, Taiwan 17.5%, and Vietnam 15%.

While total exports in 2024 decreased by 24% compared to 2022, they increased by 0.9% compared to the previous year, demonstrating that Japanese scallops can still grow steadily without relying on the Chinese Communist market.

On 20 November 2025, President Lai Ching-te of the Republic of China posted a photo on the social media platform X showing him enjoying sushi made with Hokkaido scallops and Kagoshima abalone for lunch.

U.S. Ambassador to Japan, Glass, also tweeted on X, stating that intimidation tactics seem to have become a deeply ingrained habit for Beijing.

"The last time Beijing improperly banned imports of Japanese seafood, the United States supported Japan. The same applies this time; we will continue to support Japan as an ally."

Bloomberg reported that after meeting with Japanese Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi on 20 November 2025, Glass said, "On behalf of the President, myself, and the Embassy, ​​I want to assure the Prime Minister: we support her."

He pointed out that although Beijing seems intent on escalating tensions, the United States firmly supports the U.S.-Japan alliance and remains committed to defending Japan, including the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands in Chinese).

Despite Beijing's restrictions on seafood imports and warnings against tourism and study in Japan, many Japanese businesses still strongly support Sanae Takaichi.

Meanwhile, the Japanese public is calling for domestic tourism to support businesses.

While Beijing used the "rare earth" card against Japan after the 2010 Diaoyu Islands collision incident, it did not do so this time.

According to the Liberty Times, Ke Long, a Chinese scholar and chief researcher at the Tokyo Foundation's Policy Research Institute, analyzed that the rare earth card will have little effect on Japan.

Ke Long stated that after the previous rare earth shock, Japan began developing recycling technology to recover rare earths from discarded appliances and parts, and this technology is now very mature.

On the other hand, Japan is also seeking alternative supply chains to reduce its dependence on Chinese rare earths.

Ke Long stated that Beijing's one-year postponement of rare earth export controls to the United States, the large number of Japanese companies with factories in the US, and the future potential for rare earth refining in Malaysia and other regions mean that even if China uses the "rare earth" card, it is not a significant threat to Japan.

On Chinese social media, guided by state media, heated discussions about the Sino-Japanese conflict have begun, with nationalists expressing their desire to "draw their swords" against Japan. However, no widespread anti-Japanese demonstrations have taken place.

Ke Long stated that given the current social atmosphere in China, allowing the masses to take to the streets would quickly escalate into anti-government protests.

He pointed out that CCP China's economy is in dire straits, with a rapidly widening wealth gap, accelerated decline among the lower classes, and high youth unemployment. These two groups are highly vulnerable to crime given the opportunity.

The current atmosphere in Chinese society is extremely unstable, and the CCP is completely unwilling to allow demonstrations to occur.

Lin Quanzhong, a researcher at the University of Tokyo, also believes that a wave of anti-Japanese sentiment in China is unlikely.

He analyzed for Deutsche Welle that the CCP authorities will ultimately suppress public anger; Beijing truly does not want protests to erupt.

If protests do erupt, the conflict is likely to ultimately shift towards the government.

Because the Chinese Communist economy is in such a poor state, the public would use this opportunity to vent their frustrations, which is something the Xi Jinping government does not want to see.

However, Lin Quanzhong offered another interpretation: the CCP authorities might also be using this incident to alleviate and divert domestic tensions and public resentment stemming from the poor economy.

How will this storm ultimately end? On 19 November 2025, the WeChat public account "Niu Tanqin," backed by the state-run Xinhua News Agency, published an article suggesting three possible developments: First, Takaichi would deeply reflect on her actions, retract her provocative remarks, and Japan would learn from the experience, gradually calming the Sino-Japanese dispute.

Second, Takaichi might "play dumb," hinting at refraining from similar statements but unwilling to retract her provocations, leading to continued Sino-Japanese stalemate, with the possibility of a new crisis arising at the slightest provocation.

Third, Takaichi might "give in to desperation," even making more hardline statements to appease the far right, and even launching a "lightning" visit to the Yasukuni Shrine.

However, Lin Quanzhong observed and predicted that, based on past historical experience, although Sino-Japanese friction has been frequent over the past decade, it will ultimately subside.

"Because Beijing cannot remain isolated from its neighbors forever."

In fact, for Beijing, the third major factor igniting a Sino-Japanese conflict, besides history and territory, is the Taiwan issue.

Historical issues include controversies over history textbooks and visits to the Yasukuni Shrine.

Territorial issues involve the Diaoyu Islands.

The Taiwan issue is extremely sensitive for Beijing, and this is the first time CCP China has made a significant statement to Japan on this issue.

A Wall Street Journal article on 19 November 2025 analyzed that the Sino-Japanese diplomatic crisis reflects Beijing's use of its so-called "pen and gun" strategy: domestically strengthening its unified narrative and atmosphere, while internationally attacking allies like Japan that express support for Taiwan. Its priority is to completely isolate Taiwan economically and diplomatically, forcing Taiwan to submit "without firing a single shot."

According to informed sources, Beijing's "Plan A" is to overwhelm Taiwan's economic, diplomatic, and psychological well-being, making negotiations with the CCP leadership the only viable option, thereby forcing Taiwan to submit without firing a shot.

Plan B involves military seizure, making economic coercion or political intervention the norm, thus lowering the threshold for direct conflict if necessary.

The Xi Jinping regime is currently facing internal and external difficulties. Observers believe that Beijing will not use force against Taiwan in the short term but its continued escalation of military incursions in the Taiwan Strait is intended to test the firmness of Trump's commitment to Taiwan.